1 The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 BAO XUYEN LE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of TOMMY LE; HOAI "SUNNY" 10 LE; and DIEU HO, No. 2:18-CV-00055-TSZ 11 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 12 MOTIONS IN LIMINE vs. 13 REVEREND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING 14 JR. COUNTY; and KING COUNTY DEPUTY Noted for: April 2, 2021 SHERIFF CESAR MOLINA, 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Having in good faith conferred with plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to LCR 7(d)(4), 19 defendants King County and Cesar Molina ("Defendants") respectfully move the Court 20 21 before trial, and before selection of a jury, for an order instructing the parties, their 22 witnesses and their counsel not to directly or indirectly mention, refer to, interrogate 23 regarding or convey to jurors in any manner any of the information indicated below **Daniel T. Satterberg**, Prosecuting Attorney DEFENDANT KING COUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL CIVIL DIVISION, Litigation Section 900 King County Administration Building MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1

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without first obtaining the permission of the Court outside the presence and the hearing of the jury.

Defendants further request the Court to instruct attorneys to caution their clients and each of their witnesses to follow the order entered by the Court in connection with these motions in limine.

The court may consider and rule on the admissibility of evidence. "Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials." *Luce v. United States*, 469 U.S. 38, 41, 105 S. Ct. 460 (1984).

Pursuant to the Court's Minute Order, *Dkt.245*, Defendants request the Court grant the following supplemental motions in limine.

A. SPECIFIC SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE

1. Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony Regarding Probable Cause.

In Plaintiffs' 2nd Corrected Third Amended Complaint For Damages for Violation of Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under Washington State Law: Torts Of Wrongful Death (RCW 4.20.020) & Survival Action (RCW 4.20.060) & Negligence, they specifically plead that:

Deputy Sheriffs and defendants, including King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina, *did not have probable cause* to believe that Tommy Le posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina, the other King County Deputy Sheriffs, or to others, at the time that King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina employed deadly force on Tommy Le.

6:1-5. (Emphasis added).

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DEFENDANT KING COUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2

Experts may not opine as to whether there was, in fact, probable cause. That is an ultimate conclusion of law that an expert witness may <u>not</u> offer an opinion on. See *Torres v. City of Los Angeles*, 548 F.3d 1197, 1214 n.11 (9th Cir. 2008) (the district court abused its discretion when it denied a motion in limine seeking to preclude witnesses from testifying as to whether there was in fact probable cause for an arrest); *Estes v. Moore*, 993 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1998)(expert witness may not opine on whether probable cause existed).

This Court has previously ruled that plaintiffs' experts "will not be permitted to testify at trial concerning whether or not King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina used lawful, reasonable, justified, or appropriate force when he shot Tommy Le on June 14, 2017." *Dkt.195*. The Court further ruled their experts "will not be permitted to opine about which version of events is more credible or which facts actually occurred, they may not speculate about the intent, motive, or state of mind of anyone involved, including Tommy Le and Deputy Molina, and they may not testify *about the law* concerning the use of force." *Id*.

The jury, based on the evidence presented, should be the only ones to answer the question whether the KCSO deputies had probable cause to believe that Tommy Le posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to them at the time deadly force was used.

Defendants move in limine to prevent any testimony by plaintiffs' liability experts regarding probable cause to believe that Tommy Le posed an imminent threat

1	of death or serious physical injury to King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina, the
2	other King County Deputy Sheriffs, or to others, at the time that King County Deputy
3	Sheriff Cesar Molina employed deadly force on Tommy Le.
4	Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed DisputedX
5	Tuntum Tesponse.
6	2. Motion to Exclude Cumulative Expert Testimony.
7	Plaintiffs have identified two liability experts, Scott Defoe, and William
8	Harmening, both of whom have offered similar opinions regarding Deputy Molina's
9	use of force, based on substantially similar reasoning, and relying on the same
10	information. Plaintiffs should be precluded from offering two witnesses whose opinions
11 12	are essentially the same as their testimony is needlessly cumulative. FRE 403. The Court
13	should order plaintiffs to select either Mr. Defoe or Mr. Harmening as their use of force
14	liability expert.
15	This motion is further supported by plaintiffs' representation to the Court, in
16	support of a total virtual trial, that they will only call 17 witnesses and complete their
17	case (with cross-examination of their witnesses called) in 6.5 court days.
18	At a minimum, this Court should require an offer of proof from plaintiffs on how
19	the proposed experts' testimony will be sufficiently distinct and non-duplicative to
20	overcome FRE 403.
21	Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed DisputedX
22	Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed DisputedX
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3. Motion to Limit Testimony of Expert Witness Scott Defoe.

A. To the extent plaintiffs are allowed to call forensic liability expert Scott Defoe, his testimony should be limited (beyond that already outlined in the Court's Minute Order, dated May 29, 2019. (*Dkt. 195*).

Mr. Defoe outlined all of his opinions in this case in a written report, dated December 11, 2018. *Kinerk Decl*. He listed all the documents and evidence that he relied upon in formulating his opinions in this case, including the King County Use of Force Review Board memorandum. *Kinerk Decl. Ex.1, Scott Defoe Deposition*. None of the opinions provided in Mr. Defoe's written report addressed the Use of Force Review Board hearing on plaintiffs' *Monell* claim. *Id*.

On March 13, 2019, Mr. Defoe's deposition was taken. *Kinerk Decl.* He acknowledged that he did not rely on the 2018 Shooting Review Board memorandum in formulating his opinions in this case. *Kinerk Decl., Ex.1, Defoe Dep.* 12:21-25. More importantly, defendants asked Mr. Defoe if he was going to offer any opinions regarding the post-shooting review in this case. The sum total of his answer was as follows:

10 Q Since today is my only opportunity, Mr. DeFoe,

11 to explore with you all the opinions that you've

12 formulated in this case, are you anticipating that you

13 are going to be testifying or providing opinions with

14 regards to the post-shooting review in this case? And

15 if so, tell me what those opinions are, please.

16 A Well, as it relates to Detective Christopher

17 Johnson and his report, specifically on -- on page

18 number 8 of 9, there was no mention at all in his report

19 regarding the location of the wounds to Mr. Le, where in

1	20 fact he was struck, in this case.
2	21 And I think that's significant based on the22 testimony by Deputy Molina and Officer Owens that Mr. Le
3	23 was actually moving away from the officers in a south or24 southwesterly direction, at which time he was shot.
4	25 I think that's critical because it obviously
5	1 shows that that threat no longer existed, or should have
6	2 existed with an individual carrying a Paper Mate3 ballpoint pen moving away from the officers prior to the
7	4 use of lethal force. 5 I thought that was I thought that was
8	6 critical that that was not mentioned in the report by
9	7 Detective Johnson because I think it's a critical factor 8 in this matter.
10	Kinerk Decl. Ex.1, Defoe Dep., 20:10-25, 21:1-8.
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12	At no time following Mr. Defoe's deposition did plaintiffs supplemented his
13	opinions regarding their <i>Monell</i> claim. Discovery closed on February 1, 2021 without
14	any supplemental opinions from Mr. Defoe.
15	Defendants move in limine to limit any opinion by Mr. Defoe as to any <i>Monell</i>
16	claim to the single opinion he divulged in his deposition testimony (and never in his
17	written report), namely, that Detective Johnson allegedly failed to mention the specific
18	locations of Le's bullet wounds in his Use of Force presentation. ¹
19	DI: c:(/D A 1 D: c 1 V
20	Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed Disputed X
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22	¹ Mr. Defoe's other opinion above, that Mr. Le was moving away from the officers showed no threat longer existed or should have with an individual carrying a Paper
23	Mate ballpoint pen prior to use of lethal force, is exactly the type of opinion this Court already ruled was inadmissible. <u>See</u> <i>Dkt.195</i> .
	Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorned DEFENDANT KING COLUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL CIVIL DIVISION. Litigation Section

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B. The Court issued a Minute Order, dated May 29, 2019, outlining the scope of opinions that expert witnesses Scott Defoe and William Harmening could offer at trial (*Dkt.*195). The Court's Minute Order was issued <u>before</u> plaintiffs filed their *Second* Corrected Third Amended Complaint adding a negligence claim to their case.

In light of that development and recent Washington caselaw regarding negligence in officer-involved use of force cases, Defendants move in limine to further restrict Mr. Defoe's testimony. Mr. Defoe has opined the following:

- The KCSO Deputies should have requested the KCSO Air Support Unit to establish an inner and outer perimeter.
- The KCSO Deputies should have requested the KCSO K-9 Unit respond to the scene.
- The KCSO Deputies failed to establish an inner and outer perimeter immediately upon arrival.

Kinerk Decl., Ex.1,30:2-25;31:1-13;30:33:6-25; 34:1-4; 34:14-25,35:1-2, 39:10-16, 43:16-25, 44:1-22; 46:17-25, 47:1-25;72:22-25,73:1-78:3.

These are exactly the type of expert opinions that have been excluded in use of force cases asserting a negligence theory. In *Lacy v. Snohomish County*, 14 Wn. App. 2d 1045 (2020) (unpublished), plaintiffs filed a wrongful death claim against Snohomish County (Sheriff's Office). They alleged the suspect/decedent was subjected to excessive pressure to his back while prone on the ground, resulting in an episode of excited delirium. Plaintiff's negligence claims against Snohomish County included 1) failure to stage aid immediately upon interacting with the suspect; 2) the SCSO deputy's failure to de-escalate the situation by threatening to deploy his stun gun, if the suspect did not calm down and; 3) the SCSO Deputy failed to immediately administer CPR.

DEFENDANT KING COUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 7

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The trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that as to each negligence theory there was "no evidence from which a reasonable juror could find, *without speculating*, that any of these alleged breaches more probably than not caused Cecil's death." *Id.* at *8.

The same analysis applies to Mr. Defoe's opinions outlined above in this case.

There is no evidence that the KCSO Air Unit or K-9 Unit could have arrived in the 105 seconds from the KCSO Deputies' arrival and the shooting. He admits that he had no such evidence.. More importantly, there is no evidence that a reasonable juror could find, without speculating, that had they miraculously arrived in that 105 seconds, the shooting would not have occurred.

Defoe's equally speculative opinions regarding a perimeter stage, a tactical plan or de-escalation measures fail under the Court of Appeals analysis:

In short, the testimony presented at trial provides only that *maybe* de-escalation could have prevented Cecil's death. Sara presented no evidence from which a reasonable juror could find, *without speculating*, that had Deputy Pendergrass used proper de-escalation tactics and not escalated the situation, Cecil more likely than not would have survived.

Id. at *7. (Emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals in *Lacy* specifically distinguished *Beltran-Serrano* v. *City of Tacoma*, 193 Wn.2d 537, 442 P.3d 608 (2019), the very case plaintiffs' relied upon in amending their complain to assert a negligence claim - "...in *Beltran-Serrano*, the court did not address the merits of Beltran-Serrano's claims or review whether he presented

evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find for him on the elements of negligence." *Id.* at *9.

Defendants move in limine to exclude Mr. Defoe's opinions in support of plaintiffs' negligence theories that would require jurors to speculate as the requisite causal link between the alleged act and Le's death.

Plaintiffs' Response:

Agreed ____

Disputed X

4. Motion to Limit Certain Testimony of Expert Witness William Harmening.

To the extent plaintiffs are allowed to call forensic liability expert William Harmening, his testimony should be limited. Mr. Harmening produced a written report, dated December 8, 2018. *Kinerk Decl.* In his report, Mr. Harmening listed all the documents he reviewed and the summary of his opinions. *Kinerk Decl., Ex.* 2. Mr. Harmening did not list the King County Use of Force Review Board memorandum as a document he reviewed (but did testify at his deposition he had been provided with it). *Kinerk Decl., Ex.2, 16:2-11.* Mr. Harmening's deposition was taken on March 14, 2019. *Kinerk Decl.* Mr. Harmening did not produce any opinions relating to plaintiffs' *Monell* claim in his report or at his deposition. *Id.*

Defendants moved to exclude the opinions offered by Mr. Harmening, including in his untimely declaration filed in opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. *See Dkts.112, Harmening Dec., 153, Defendant King County's Motions In Limine* (#20); 173, *Defendants Supplemental Motions In Limine Regarding Expert Testimony*. As stated, the Court issued a Minute Order, dated May 20, 2019 limiting the scope of

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plaintiffs' experts Mr. Harmening and Scott Defoe. None of Mr. Harmening's written report, declaration or deposition testimony address any *Monell* claim, specifically the Use of Force Review Board hearing.

Discovery closed on February 1, 2021 without any supplemental opinions from Mr. Harmening. Defendants move in limite to limit any opinions by Mr. Harmening as to any *Monell* claim.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed _____

Disputed X

5. Motion to Enforce Court's Minute Regarding Expert Witness Robert Johnson.

Plaintiffs originally endorsed forensic economist Robert Johnson as an expert witness in this case. *Kinerk Decl.* The opinions he offered included proffered testimony on hedonic damages. *Id.* Defendants moved in limine to exclude any of his testimony on hedonic damages. *Dkt.153, #27, 21:8-23.* Plaintiffs responded by notifying the Court and parties that that they would *not* be calling Mr. Johnson as a witness and defendants' motion to preclude him from testifying about hedonic damages was therefore STRICKEN as moot. *Dkt.195, 2:14-15.*

The Court entered a separate Minute Order on May 28, 2019, ruling that defendants' "Motion to exclude evidence on hedonic damages is STRICKEN as moot." *Dkt.192, 4:7-8.*

Defendants have relied on plaintiffs' representation that they were not calling Mr. Johnson at trial. *Kinerk Decl.* Plaintiffs never supplemented or updated Mr. Johnson's

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report at any time after discovery was re-opened and prior to the Court's discovery deadline of February 1, 2021. *Id*.

Based on 1) plaintiffs' representation to the Court that Mr. Johnson would not be called as a witness at trial; 2) the Court's Minute Orders confirming that; 3) defendants' reliance on plaintiffs' representation and the Court's Minute Orders and: 4) the fact plaintiffs never supplemented Mr. Johnson's report (rendering it unnecessary to conduct his deposition), defendants respectfully ask the Court to enforce its order precluding Mr. Johnson from testifying at trial.

Agreed	X
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Disputed _____

6. Motion to Exclude Cumulative Evidence of Plaintiffs' Damages.

FRE 403 provides that the court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of an undue delay, a waste of time, or a needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FRE 403. It is well-settled that a court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under FRE 403 is entitled to "considerable deference." *McEuin v. Crown Equipment Corp.*, 328 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs have listed *four* of Le's alternative high school teachers – Curt Peterson, Molly Ward, Susan Blythe-Goodman, and Danika Martinez to testify about plaintiffs' damages. While it is anticipated that the Court would permit an appropriate number of Le's teachers on the issue of damages, it appears that all of these witnesses will be unnecessarily cumulative and of little additional probative value. Defendants accordingly

request that plaintiffs' presentation on damages as established by Le's schoolteachers be limited accordingly, or, in the alternative, that plaintiffs provide an offer of proof to the Court as to the importance and uniqueness of each witness' testimony.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed _____ Disputed __X

7. Motion to Exclude any Expert Testimony by Tam Dinh, PhD. as to the Effect of the Le Shooting on the Vietnamese Community or the Le Family.

Tam Dinh was not timely identified as a witness when the original discovery deadline in this case closed. The Court subsequently ordered that the defendants could take her deposition once discovery reopened. *Dkt.* 246.

Plaintiffs never identified Ms. Dinh as an expert witness nor provided a summary of her expected testimony for trial. Instead they submitted Ms. Dinh's declaration and resume support of a motion. *Dkts.* 118 & 118-1.

On November 9, 2020 defendants took the deposition of Ms. Dinh. *Kinerk Decl.* She indicated that she has never qualified as an expert witness in state or federal court, nor ever performed forensic work in her capacity as a professor in social work. *Kinerk Dec., Ex.3, 6:21-25; 7:1-5.* She never counseled the Le family members following this shooting incident. *Id.* at 16:13-20.

She indicated that she saw some of the Le family at an ACRS meeting in her capacity with Commission on Asian Pacific American Affairs (CAPAA) Commission. She also saw them when she attended a Le court proceeding to show community support for the family. *Id.* at 12:2-18.

Ms. Dinh also testified about her declaration in which she stated that she was present when former KCSO Sheriff John Urquhart allegedly said, "I don't know why the deputies shot him - I would not have shot him, maybe I'd have wrestled him to the ground, but not shot him. The officers will have to explain their actions in court." Dkt.118, ¶ 10;5:9-11.

Defendants move in limine to restrict Ms. Dinh to testifying to Sheriff Urquhart's remarks, (assuming proper evidentiary foundation is established).

Ms. Dinh should <u>not</u> be allowed to testify as to the alleged emotional toll this case has had on the Vietnamese community. The Court already granted defendants' motion in limine excluding evidence concerning the effect of this shooting on the local community. *See Dkt.195, #18.* This Court has also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' Outrage claim. *Dkts.178 & 189.* Any effort by plaintiffs that uses Ms. Dinh's professional credentials to testify about how Vietnamese people respond to death and public embarrassment is irrelevant.

In addition, any proffered testimony about "institutional betrayal" between the Le/Vietnamese and law enforcement is likewise irrelevant under FRE 401, 402 and 403.

Ms. Dinh's belief that that any "incorrect" press release by the KCSO would cause the Le family great psychological harm should also be excluded. Such testimony doesn't address any viable negligence or constitutional claim and the Court already dismissed plaintiff's Outrage claim. *Dkts.178 1:16-17;189*. Ms. Dinh's personal opinions are just that, personal opinions, and should be precluded at trial due to lack of foundation and under FRE 401, 402 and 403.

DEFENDANT KING COUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 13

Plaintiffs' Response:	Agreed X	Disputed	
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8. Motion to Exclude Deborah Jacobs as Witness at Trial.

On October 15, 2020, this Court filed Minute Entry indicating "plaintiffs may depose Deborah Jacobs for three (3) hours, limited to the topic of the Office of Law Enforcement Oversight (OLEO) Report." *Dkt.246*. While the Court allowed the deposition to proceed, it expressed its reservations about admissibility of her testimony or as a witness at trial. *Dkt.250*, *Ex.2*. The Court's reservation was justified. The reason is simple.

In Washington, *former* employees cannot bind the corporation or government entity. <u>See</u> *Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No.* 203, 186 Wn.2d 769, 381 P.3d 1188 (2016):

A school district, like any organization, can act only through its constituents and agents. See RPC 1.13 cmt. 1. Corporate attorney-client privilege may arise when "the constituents of an organizational client communicate[] with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity." Id. at cmt. 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). An organizational client, including a governmental agency, can require its own employees to disclose facts material to their duties (with some limits not relevant here) to its counsel for investigatory or litigation purposes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). But everything changes when employment ends. When the employer-employee relationship terminates, this generally terminates the agency relationship. As a result, the former employee can no longer bind the corporation and no longer owes duties of loyalty, obedience, and confidentiality to the corporation. See id. & cmt. d

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Id. at. 780.²

At her deposition, Ms. Jacobs acknowledged that she is no longer employed by King County.³ *Kinerk Decl., Ex.4, 17:18-21, 40:8-12.* As such, her proffered testimony cannot bind King County and is irrelevant.

Ms. Jacobs also testified that she has never qualified an expert witness in federal or state court. *Id.* at 39:8-25; 40:1-7. She testified that she retained Mr. Michael Gennaco to conduct a systemic review of the Le shooting because she had neither the resources nor expertise to do it herself. *Id.* at 9:18-21, 12:21-25. Ms. Jacob's personal opinions, notwithstanding her *past* position as OLEO Director, are irrelevant and she should be excluded from testifying as a witness under CR 402, 402 and 403.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed X

9. <u>Motion to Exclude any reference to the Hague Convention and bullets used by KCSO.</u>

In Plaintiffs' 2nd Corrected Third Amended Complaint for Damages for Violation of Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under Washington State Law: Torts Of Wrongful Death (RCW 4.20.020) & Survival Action (RCW 4.20.060) & Negligence, they allege, in part:

- 55. The 9 mm bullets used to shoot and kill Tommy Le were hollow point 9mm bullets, which is an expanding bullet with a hollowed-out tip designed to expand and flatten when it enters a human body so as to disrupt more tissue as it travels through the person's body.
- 56. The use of hollow point ammunition in warfare is barred by The Hague Convention; the relevant portion of which reads: "the contracting parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in human body. . ."

² <u>See</u> also Hermanson v. MultiCare Health System, Inc. 196 Wn.2d 578, 475 P.3d 484 (2020).

³ She readily conceded that she has filed a Claim for Damages against King County demanding in two million dollars. *Id.* at 40:24-25; 41:1-6.

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(RCW 4.20.020) & Survival Action (RCW 4.20.060) & Negligence, they specifically plead two theories of negligence:

- King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina [and the KCSO deputies at the scene] did not use de-escalation techniques to detain Tommy Le before he was shot.
- King County Deputy Sheriff Cesar Molina [and the KCSO deputies at the scene] did not use effective non-lethal techniques to detain Tommy Le before he was shot.

Dkt.234 at 5:16-22.

Plaintiffs are limited to the theories the negligence theories they plead in their Plaintiffs' 2nd Corrected Third Amended for Damages. See Molly v. City of Bellevue, 71 Wn. App. 382, 385, 859 P.2d 613 (1993)(complaint must apprise defendant of the nature of plaintiff's claims and legal grounds upon which claim rests); Dewey v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 95 Wn. App 18, 26 (1999)(A party who does not plead a cause of action or theory of recovery cannot finesse the issue later by inserting the theory into trial briefs and contending it was in the case all along).

Defendants respectfully move in limine to restrict plaintiffs' negligence theories to those actually plead above and developed in their cause of action.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed __X__

11. Motion to Exclude any Reference to OLEO Report.

This Court accurately defined the issues at play in this lawsuit – whether excessive force was used in violation of Le's constitutional rights and whether a viable *Monell* claim can be established:

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THE COURT: Mr. Arnold, isn't that whats the jury is being summoned to determine, whether this was a lawful shooting, whether it was excessive force, whether it was a sham investigation afterwards? I can't conceive that this OLEO report would ever be admitted in evidence.

*Dkt.*250, Ex.2, *Verbatim of Proceedings*, (10/15/20) ,25:21-25.

Plaintiffs have made a concerted effort to muddy the legal issues in this case in an attempt impose liability, based on character assassination. The Le shooting occurred on June 13, 2017. The Use of Force Review Board memorandum was issued August 22, 2018. The OIR ("OLEO") report was produced in September 2020 by a non-King County entity hired by a non-KCSO agency over three years after the shooting, and over two years after the Use Of Force Review Board memorandum. This report does not address the legal issues in this case.

Plaintiffs have cited *Aranda v. City of McMinnville*, 942 F.Supp.2d 1096 (2013) to argue that the OLEO Report is admissible. That case is clearly distinguishable.

In *Aranda*, the defendants objected to the *actual* Use of Force Review Board findings, which found that the officers' use of force (captured on video) violated McMinnville police standards. In this case, Le is asking the Court to rely on a report prepared by an outside agency (OIR) at the request of an outside agency (OLEO) to look at everything that contributed to the shooting and learn from it. The OIR report is not the King County Review Board memorandum.

The court in *McMinnville* found the Use of Force Review Board admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403 because it focused on the officers' conduct. The OLEO Report did not.

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The court found that the Use of Force Review Board report was not inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 407 because it did not recommend changes, citing *Wilson v. Beebe*, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.1985). The Le OLEO report is a critique clothed in recommended changes. The OLEO report cannot be construed in any fashion as a government record and doesn't qualify as a hearsay exception under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A) and, therefore should be ruled inadmissible.

This Court previously excluded another report involving KCSO and Le, the University of Florida Brechner Center for Freedom of Information Report on "Transparency and Media Relations in High-Profile Police Cases." (See *Dkt.192*, #15). The same analysis applies with the OLEO report.

Lastly, this Court already granted Defendant's Motion to Exclude Post-Incident Suggestions for Policy Changes. *Dkt*.246. The OLEO report is exactly the same type of document that suggests post-Le incident policy changes and should be excluded.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed _____ Disputed _X___

12. Motion to Exclude King County Council member Girmay Zahilay.

In much the same way that plaintiffs have attempted to have the OLEO report admitted, they also seek to call King County Councilmember Girmay Zahilay at trial. Defendants move in limine to exclude his testimony at trial.

Councilmember Zahilay, along with six other King County councilmembers of the King County Council Law and Justice Committee, heard about the OLEO report on September 2, 2020. *Dkt.249, King County's Motion To Quash And For Protective Order*. The

remarks of Councilmember Zahilay were recorded and videotaped. *Kinerk Decl.*Defendants objected to plaintiffs' request to depose Councilmember Zahilay based on legislative immunity and testimonial privilege. *Id.* Councilmember Zahilay readily admitted that the remarks he made at this hearing were not made on behalf of the entire King County Council nor on behalf of King County in the civil litigation arising out of this June 14, 2017 incident. *Dkt.251*, \P 9.

This Court granted King County's motion to quash and for protective order, finding that to the extent plaintiffs sought to interrogate Councilmember Zahilay "about the views he formed after reviewing Mr. Gennaco's report and considering the responses of Sheriff Johanknecht, such inquiry would have a chilling effect on legislative functioning, <u>see id</u>. at *7-10, while producing nothing more than inadmissible lay opinions based entirely on hearsay." *Id.* at 3:16-20-22.

If this Court was to allow Councilmember Zahilay to testify, Defendants would have no recourse but to call the other councilmembers who respectively disagreed with Councilmember Zahilay and the trial would turn into a circus of inadmissible lay opinions based entirely on hearsay. Councilmember Zahilay's testimony is inadmissible under FRE 402, 402, 403, 801, 802 and 803.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed _X___

13. Motion to Exclude Testimony/Opinion That Witnesses Did Not Believe Le Had Anything in His Hands When He Attacked Civilians and Police.

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The defendants move in limine to preclude any testimony by non-eyewitnesses as to whether or not Le had anything in his hands during his confrontation with civilians or police. Le's family members have opined that they do not believe he had anything in his hands. Such testimony is mere speculation and should be precluded.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed X___

14. Motion to Exclude Argument that Le Was "Unarmed"

The defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiffs from arguing in opening or closing statement that Le was "unarmed" when he confronted the civilians or police. A pen can also be used as a weapon and, therefore, the argument that Le was "unarmed" should be precluded. This motion is not intended to preclude argument that Tommy Le did not have a "weapon" in his hand but Plaintiffs should not be able to characterize him as "unarmed."

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed X

15. <u>Motion to Exclude Wilson Hayes' Testimony Regarding His "Kicking Pen" Experiment.</u>

Deputies Owens and Thompson saw a pen in Le's hand after he fell. Owens stated he kicked the pen away. Deputy Easterbrook saw and photographed the pen and estimated it was approximately 8 feet from where Le was laying. In his report, Mr. Hayes concludes that the pen was located 20.7 feet "away from the blood on the road where Mr. Le initially fell to the ground." *Kinerk Decl. Exhibit 5, at 41.* Hayes does not indicate how he arrived at 20.7 feet.

DEFENDANT KING COUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 21

Hayes attempted to recreate the kicking of the pen from Le's hand, as Dep. Owens stated he had done, to see how far it would travel. *Id.* at at 30. Hayes used a similar type of ball point pen and tried three different types of kicks: (1) a kick at the center of gravity of the pen, (2) a kick directed at the ballpoint tip of the pen; and (3) a kick directed at the ballpoint tip of the pen with a skeletal model hand resting at center of pen. *Id.* Hayes stated that in his experiment the pen was only able to be kicked 8.5 feet plus or minus 4.5 feet over an asphalt surface. Kinerk Decl,. Ex. 5 at 36. This evidence should be excluded. First, Hayes could not possibly recreate the exact situation that occurred on the night Le was killed because it is not known the condition the pen was in when it was kicked out of Le's hand and Hayes' experiment only used intact ballpoint pens. Second, since even Hayes' experiment showed the pen could be kicked 13 feet, there is no significant difference from the 20.7 feet that Hayes alleges the pen was located. Lastly, this Court has already excluded evidence that the pen was planted so Hayes' "pen kicking" experiment is irrelevant. This testimony should be excluded.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed X

16. <u>Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Wilson Hayes' Testimony Regarding Attempted Reconstruction of Tool Marks on Hernandez' Door.</u>

Kevin Hernandez stated he was chased into his house by Le, who was armed with a knife. According to Hernandez, Le "stabbed" at Hernandez's door with the knife, leaving marks. Photographs of the door were taken by police. Plaintiffs' expert, Wilson "Toby" Hayes, attempted to reconstruct the marks left on Hernandez' door by

DEFENDANT KING COUNTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 22

using a "similar piece of wood trim and aluminum weather strip." Kinerk Decl., Ex. 5 at 23. In Hayes' experiment, marks were made using the corner of a piece of 2 x 4, the wooden handle of a brush, a ballpoint pen (not the same type as found in Le's hand) both with and without the tip protruding, and a knife. *Id.* The marks were then compared to the marks found on Hernandez's door. Hayes was unable to recreate the marks on either the wood trim or the aluminum weather strip. However, without explanation, Hayes opined that "[i]t is apparent that the marking on the subject door frame was not made by a sharp object similar to the knife or pen tested, but rather by a softer blunt object such as the wooden handle of the brush or a 2 x 4." *Id.* Evidence of Hayes' attempted reconstruction experiment should be excluded because he was unable to replicate the marks and, therefore, cannot opine what caused them. The only sharp objects Hayes tested with were a ballpoint pen and a knife. Hayes did not use the same type of ballpoint pen that had been found in Le's hand after he was shot. And Hayes does not have any knowledge of what type of knife Le had in his hand when he stabbed at Hernandez's door. It is just as possible that Le stabbed at the door with the handle end of the knife, not the sharp end, but Hayes did not test with that. Hayes has provided no foundation for his conclusion that a "blunt" object rather than a sharp object caused the marks. Therefore, the experiment and his conclusion should be excluded as it is incomplete and misleading.

Washington State Patrol Crime Lab forensic scientist Dijana Coric, extensively trained in forensic toolmark testing, attempted a similar toolmark reconstruction using knives recovered from Le's apartment. She was also unable to recreate the exact marks

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made on Le's door but opined that the marks on the door were made with some type of sharp pointed object. The defendants will not offer this testimony if Hayes' toolmark testimony is excluded.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed _X

17. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Wilson Hayes' Opinion That Det. Mellis Tampered With the Door Evidence By Making Marks Through the Markings Made by Le.

In his report, Plaintiffs' expert Wilson "Toby" Hayes opined that Det. Mike Mellis of the King County Sheriff's Office "gouged into and directly through the markings alleged by Mr. Hernandez to have been created by Mr. Le." *Kinerk Decl., Ex. 5 at 24*. Dr. Hayes supported his opinion by comparing two photographs purported to be of the same location on Le's door where markings were observed. *Id.* at 22. This testimony should be excluded.

Two photographs from Hayes' report, at 22: Figure 12:

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Figure 12: Photographs of the trim on Mr. Hernandez's door taken on: (LEFT) June 14, 2017, 2:46 AM, by Detective Zydek (Cannon PowerShot G15), showing the mark Mr. Hernandez alleged was made by Mr. Le on the night of the incident; and (RIGHT) on June 23, 2017, 11:37 AM, by Detective Mellis (Nikon D5200), showing the mark created by Detective Mellis using an ink-pen, on the mark Mr. Hernandez alleged was created by Mr. Le.

These same two photographs were shown to Det. Mellis at his deposition and he did not recognize them nor confirm that they showed markings made by him on the door. *Kinerk Decl., Ex. 6, Mellis deposition, 9:19-25 -11:18.* It is not even clear that the photos show the same portion of the door. Furthermore, Det. Mellis made clear that the markings he made on the door, attempting to recreate the marks made by Le, were done on the lower part of the door and not in the area where Mr. Hernandez said Le had stabbed. Mellis deposition, 12:4-11. There is no factual basis for Hayes' opinion that Det. Mellis "gouged" into the markings made by Le and this inflammatory testimony and Figure 12 should be excluded.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed X

18. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Expert Wilson Hayes' Opinion That The Bullet (CTJ 25) Protruding From Le's Abdomen Was a "Shored Exit Wound."

The defendants move in limine to preclude Hayes from opining that the bullet wound in Le's abdomen was a "shored exit wound," because Hayes does not have the forensic expertise to offer such an opinion and has not even examined the bullets in this case.

Throughout his report, Hayes refers to the bullet protruding from Le's abdomen as evidence of a "shored exit wound." Hayes cites an article describing a shored exit wound as follows:

Shored exit wounds . . . arise in situations where the skin around the exit site is abraded at the moment the bullet stretches and breeches the skin. A subject

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lying on the ground or against a wall when shot, and the bullet's exit site supported by the surface, will sustain a shored exit wound.

Kinerk Decl., Ex. 5 at 31. Hayes has no training in the forensic examination of gunshot wounds in the body. While Hayes has received training in the anatomy of the body, he has not studied nor been trained in forensic pathology nor, specifically, the impact of gunshot wounds on the body. *Decl. of Kinerk. Ex. 7, Hayes deposition* at 61:22-25 – 62: 1-9.

Hayes acknowledged in his deposition that his only training regarding gunshot analysis is from his anatomy training in medical school and reading literature. *Decl. of Kinerk, Ex. 7, Hayes deposition* at 61: 22-25 – 62: 1-9. Hayes also admitted he has not examined the bullets in this case and that he would need to do so to confirm his opinions:

And I should say – at some point I said that I need to look at those bullets. That would be confirmatory in terms of the impact surface . . .

Kinerk Decl., Exhibit 7, Hayes deposition at 80:23-25.

Without forensic pathology training in how bullets impact the body, Hayes cannot possibly opine that this is evidence of a shored exit wound. In fact, in the autopsy report, the forensic pathologist did not refer to it that way and will testify it is not a shored exit wound. Additionally, Hayes has never examined the bullet (CTJ 25). Instead, based on photos produced by Washington State Patrol Crime Lab scientist Dijana Coric, he opined that the markings on the bullet show that it hit a hard surface.

Hayes has based his opinion that Le was shot while on the ground on the fact that it was a "shored exit wound." This opinion should be excluded as he does not have the expertise to render such a statement.

Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed ____ Disputed X

19. Motion to Exclude Hayes From Testifying that Bullets Were Tampered With by Police or Mishandled by WSPCL Scientist Dijana Coric.

In his rebuttal report, Hayes alleged that the bullet evidence, specifically CTJ 24, was tampered with or mishandled by the police or by Dijana Coric of the Washington State Patrol Crime Lab. *Decl. of Kinerk, Ex. 9.* This evidence should be excluded. Since Hayes' rebuttal report was issued, a second deposition was taken of Det. Chris Johnson clearly establishing chain of custody of the bullet evidence. It was sealed by the Medical Examiner's Office, picked up by Det. James Belford of the King County Sheriff's Office, sealed in an outer envelope, opened at a viewing by Plaintiffs' counsel on December 4, 2017, and then resealed until opened as the Crime Lab. The documentation supporting this chain of custody has been provided and was discussed during Det. Johnson's second deposition.

During Ms. Coric's deposition, she was asked about the different appearance of bullet CTJ 24 in a photo taken by the medical examiner and a photo taken by her. At the time, she indicated she was not sure why it had changed but believed it was taken from a different angle. *Kinerk Decl., Ex. 8, Coric Deposition at* 22:19-23. However, in a recent meeting with Defendants' counsel, she clarified that she had misunderstood

1	Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning and that she had manually straightened some of the
2	petals on CTJ 24 with her hands rather than pliers, in order to examine the bullet. She
3	then photographed the bullet. Because the bending of the petals was with her hand and
4	not pliers, it was not noted in the Bullet Worksheet, but was documented with
5	photographs. KC_DISC_0088945.
6	As the alleged "spoliation" of bullet CTJ 24 has now been explained and chain of
7	custody established, it would be prejudicial to allow this argument and it should be
8	excluded. Plaintiffs are certainly entitled to question Ms. Coric about her
10	misunderstanding of the deposition questions but should not be allowed to argue or
11	present testimony from Hayes that the bullets were tampered with.
12	Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed Disputed X
13	20. Motion to Exclude Evidence That the King County Sheriff Will Soon Be
13 14	20. Motion to Exclude Evidence That the King County Sheriff Will Soon Be Appointed by the King County Council.
14	Appointed by the King County Council.
14 15	Appointed by the King County Council. Last year, the citizens of King County passed a charter allowing the King County
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Appointed by the King County Council. Last year, the citizens of King County passed a charter allowing the King County Sheriff to be appointed by the King Council rather than elected by the citizens. The defendant moves to exclude any reference or argument about this as it is irrelevant to this trial. Plaintiffs' Response: Agreed X Disputed

s/Daniel L. Kinerk

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 18, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing document(s) with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System which will send notification of such filing to the following participants:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2021 at Bellevue, Washington.

Rafael A. Munoz-Cintron

Legal Assistant

King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office

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